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The view that policies directed at the real exchange 
rate can have an important effect on economic growth 
has been gaining adherents in recent years. Unlike 
the traditional “misalignment” view that temporary 
departures of the real exchange rate from its equilibrium 
level harm growth by distorting a key relative price in the 
economy, the recent literature stresses the growth effects 
of the equilibrium real exchange rate itself, with the claim 
being that a depreciated equilibrium real exchange rate 
promotes eco¬nomic growth. While there is no consensus 
on the precise channels through which this effect is 
generated, an increasingly common view in policy circles 
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points to saving as the channel of transmission, with 
the claim that a depreciated real exchange rate raises 
the domestic saving rate -- which in turn stimulates 
growth by increasing the rate of capital accumulation. 
This paper offers a preliminary exploration of this claim. 
Drawing from standard analytical models, stylized facts 
on saving and real exchange rates, and existing empirical 
research on saving determinants, the paper assesses the 
link between the real exchange rate and saving. Overall, 
the conclusion is that saving is unlikely to provide the 




Real Exchange Rates, Saving and Growth: 
Is There a Link? 
 



























JEL classification codes: F43, E21, O11 
 
Keywords: real exchange rate, saving, growth. 
 
This paper was originally prepared for the Growth Commission. We thank Ann 
Harrison, Roberto Zagha, and participants in a Yale University workshop for 
helpful comments and suggestions, and Enrique Moral for able research 
assistance. Any remaining errors are our own responsibility. The views expressed 
here are only ours and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank, its 
Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. 
   1
1.  Introduction 
The view that policies directed at the real exchange rate can have 
an important effect on economic growth has been gaining adherents in 
recent years (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003, Rodrik 2006, Prasad et. al. 
2006, Eichengreen 2007, Rodrik 2007). This "new view" on the links 
between the real exchange rate and growth goes beyond the traditional 
"disequilibrium" view that persistent real exchange rate misalignment 
harms growth by distorting a key relative price in the economy, or that real 
exchange rate volatility is harmful for growth because it tends to obscure 
an important macroeconomic relative price signal. The traditional view 
was primarily concerned with the macroeconomic impact of temporary 
departures of the real exchange rate from its equilibrium level. In contrast, 
the new view focuses on highly persistent departures – extending over as 
long as several decades (see the examples in Rodrik 2007). We interpret 
this new view as stressing the growth effects of the equilibrium real 
exchange rate itself, with the claim being that a depreciated equilibrium 
real exchange rate promotes economic growth. However, the literature 
addressing this issue is in its infancy, and there is no consensus on the 
precise channels through which this effect is generated. There are two 
dominant views (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2007a). 
The first, articulated in both policy and academic circles, 
emphasizes the effect of real exchange rate depreciation on the 
composition of domestic production. Specifically, a depreciated real 
exchange rate shifts production from nontraded to traded goods. The link 
from output composition to growth is through economy-wide productivity 
improvements generated by the production of some types of traded goods 
(e.g., exported manufactured goods) through mechanisms such as 
technology and skill transfers associated with "learning by doing" that is 
external to the firm. If such mechanisms are important, a change in the 
composition of output in favor of goods that create external effects if this 
type would increase the economy
’s growth rate without necessarily 
affecting the rate of capital accumulation. We can refer to this as the "TFP 
growth" channel. The second, which seems to be increasingly common in 
policy circles, links a depreciated real exchange rate to growth through 
effects on the domestic saving rate. The claim here is that a depreciated real 
exchange rate tends to increase the domes-tic saving rate, and a higher 
saving rate stimulates growth by increasing the rate of capital   2
                                                
accumulation.
1 We can refer to this as the 
“capital accumulation
” channel. 
Both channels are potentially relevant, but the TFP growth channel, 
though it has recently drawn increased interest, is of older vintage (it 
provided one interpretation of Dutch disease in the literature of the 1980s, 
for instance), and has consequently received much more attention than the 
capital accumulation channel. Neither the internal consistency nor the 
empirical plausibility of the latter has yet been carefully explored. 
The view that a capital accumulation channel may be of potential 
empirical importance is motivated by the observation that, both currently 
as well as in the recent past, several countries that have achieved sustained 
high growth rates have simultaneously exhibited depreciated real exchange 
rates and high domestic saving rates. China is the most prominent current 
example, but over previous decades the association between depreciated 
real exchange rates and high saving rates has also been observed in high-
performing Asian economies such as Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, as 
well as in Chile. The opposite constellation of outcomes -- an 
appreciated real exchange rate, low domestic saving, and low growth -- 
has also been apparent in highly visible cases, for example pre-1995 
Mexico. This raises the questions of whether there is a systematic 
macroeconomic relationship between the real exchange rate and the 
saving rate, and whether that relationship is the key to these countries’
 
growth performance. 
It is important to note that there are two conceptual links in the 
causal chain that underlies the capital accumulation channel: from the 
real exchange rate to the saving rate, and from the saving rate to 
growth. The second of these links is a familiar one, and has long 
underpinned mainstream views of the growth process even though, as we 
shall note below, it is far from uncontroversial, both theoretically as 
well as empirically. The first link is a more novel one. Analytically, it 
is based on the notion that if the real exchange rate is adopted as a 
policy target, and if a depreciation in the real exchange rate is to 
improve a country
’s current account balance, then it must increase the 
country
’s saving rate relative to its rate of investment. The capital 
accumulation view implicitly assumes that the increase in the domestic 
saving rate is devoted only in part to an accumulation of claims on the 
 
1A depreciated real exchange rate could also encourage investment by raising profitability in the 
tradable sector, if the latter is more capital-intensive than the nontradable sector (e.g., as in 
Kouri 1978). However, this mechanism – recently stressed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2007b) -- is conceptually distinct from the saving channel that is the focus of this paper.    3
rest of the world (a current account improvement). The rest of it results 
in an increase in domestic investment that increases the country
’s 
growth rate.  Conditions for the latter to be true are of interest in their 
own right, but more intriguing -- because less familiar --- is the 
relationship between the real exchange rate and the saving rate.  That 
relationship is the focus of this paper.  
Some observers have recently argued that such a relationship 
exists, but have not necessarily interpreted it as reflecting causation 
from a depreciated real exchange rate to a high saving rate to a high 
growth rate driven by capital accumulation.  Bernanke (2005), for 
example, argues that, in order both to wean themselves from foreign 
financing of domestic investment as well as to amass a stock of liquid 
claims on the rest of the world as self-insurance against a repeat of the 
1997-98 Asian crisis, several important developing countries have 
explicitly sought to achieve high domestic saving rates through means 
other than exchange rate policy. However, because a high saving rate 
tends to depress domestic demand, these countries have been able to 
sustain internal balance only by maintaining a depreciated real 
exchange rate. In Bernanke
ís view, therefore, causation runs from a 
high saving rate to a depreciated real exchange rate. If this view is 
correct, an empirical correlation between saving rates and real exchange 
rates therefore cannot be interpreted as evidence of a capital 
accumulation channel at work. 
In contrast to the direction of causation emphasized by 
Bernanke, other analysts have devised models in which an explicit 
policy of pursuing a depreciated real exchange drives a high domestic 
saving rate. For example, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (DFG, 
2004) argue that a depreciated real exchange rate has long been central 
to the export-driven development strategy pursued by several Asian 
countries, including China. In their view, high saving rates in these 
countries are at least in part the result of the pursuit of such an exchange 
rate policy. The link between a depreciated real exchange rate and the 
saving rate arises because a depreciated real exchange rate tends to shift 
aggregate demand away from traded to nontraded goods, requiring an 
increase in the real interest rate to maintain internal balance. The high real 
interest rate restrains aggregate demand in part by increasing the domestic 
saving rate. Thus, from this perspective causation runs from the real 
exchange rate through the real interest rate to the saving rate.  
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (LYS, 2007b) also claim that a   4
                                                
more depreciated real exchange rate results in higher saving, but through a 
different channel: a more depreciated exchange rate is associated with lower 
real wages, inducing firms to invest more and to increase their saving to 
finance the additional in-vestment, thereby raising overall saving. 
While all of these models describe links between the real exchange 
rate and the saving rate, they do not provide the analytical basis for a 
causal chain from a depreciated real exchange rate to a higher saving rate 
and from a higher saving rate to a higher rate of capital accumulation
2. As 
already mentioned, in Bernanke
ís framework causation runs from the 
saving rate to the real exchange rate, rather than vice versa. In the DFG 
framework, the direction of causation runs in the right direction -- from the 
real exchange rate to the saving rate -- but the next link in the capital 
accumulation channel --from higher saving to more rapid growth --would 
not tend to emerge in that framework, because the same high real interest 
rate that induces a higher domestic saving rate would also tend to 
discourage domestic investment, making this a better story about the 
current account outcome (which is what it was intended to be) than about 
domestic capital accumulation. Finally, even if a more depreciated real 
exchange rate induces higher investment and thus higher corporate saving 
as in the LYS framework, causation also runs in the wrong direction in 
this framework: from the real exchange rate directly to investment and 
from the latter to saving. Thus, exchange rate policy affects investment 
directly, rather than through saving. 
Accordingly, both the existence of a link between the real exchange 
rate and the saving rate, as well as the interpretation of that link if it exists, 
are open to question. This paper is a preliminary exploration of both of 
these issues. It seeks to answer the following questions: 
a. Is the association between the real exchange rate and the saving rate in 
the episodes described above sui generis, or is there a broader correlation 
between real exchange rates and saving rates in the international 
experience? 
b. Do standard open-economy models offer an analytical basis for a causal 
relationship between exchange rate policy -- and specifically a depreciated 
real exchange rate -- and the national saving rate? 
c. If an analytical basis for such a link exists, is there any empirical 
evidence for it? Specifically, what role --if any -- does exchange rate 
policy play in the literature on cross-country differences in saving rates? 
In particular, to what extent have explanations of saving behavior in 
 
2 To be fair, none of these models was designed for this purpose.   5
                                                
high-saving countries identified the behavior of the real exchange rate 
as a key determinant of the saving rate? 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we 
examine the empirical evidence on the correlation between the real 
exchange rate and saving in the international experience, to determine 
whether this correlation has arisen only in special cases or is a broader 
feature of that experience. Section 3 explores the effects on the saving 
rate of an exchange rate policy designed to sustain a depreciated value 
of the real exchange rate in the context of a standard intertemporal open-
economy model. Section 4 provides a brief review of the empirical 
literature on the determinants of cross-country differences in saving 
rates, as well as of that explaining saving behavior in the high saving-
high growth countries, to establish what --if any -- role has been 
accorded to the behavior of the real exchange rate in this literature. The 
final section summarizes the implications of our findings for the capital 
accumulation channel. 
2. Savings and the Real Exchange Rate: International Evidence 
Aside from the episodic evidence mentioned earlier, is there 
more systematic evidence linking real exchange rates and saving rates? 
To determine whether the association between the real exchange rate and 
saving rate is a characteristic of the international experience, in this 
section we examine the correlation between the saving rate and the real 
exchange rate in a broad cross section of countries. The real exchange 
rate, defined as the relative price of traded goods in terms of nontraded 
goods, is measured by the (log) GDP deflator from the Penn World 
Tables, which captures each country
’s national price level in dollar 
terms (relative to the U.S.). If the law of one price holds, the dollar 
price of traded goods will be equalized across countries, but the dollar 
price of nontraded goods will be lower where nontraded goods are 
cheaper -- i.e., where the real exchange rate is more depreciated. Hence 
the dollar price level, which is the weighted average of the dollar prices 
of traded and nontraded goods, should be lower where the real 
exchange rate is more depreciated. In turn, the saving rate is measured 
as the gross national saving rate.
3 
 
3 Gross national saving is defined as the difference between gross national disposable in-come 
(GNDI for short, equal to GNP plus net unrequited transfers from abroad) and total consumption 
expenditure. The saving rate therefore is the ratio of gross national saving to GNDI. See 
Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000) for an overview of this and other measures of aggregate 
saving. Figure 1.   
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Using these measures and international panel data covering 94 
countries over 1975-2005, Figure 1 plots the national saving rate against 
the (log) real exchange rate. In this context, a higher value of the latter 
represents a real appreciation. Since our interest is in the relationship 
between the equilibrium real exchange rate and the saving rate, lower-
frequency observations of both variables are of greater interest than 
annual data. Accordingly, the figure plots decade averages (top panel) as 
well as 30-year averages (bottom panel). The results are very similar in 
both cases: a higher saving rate is strongly associated with a more 
appreciated real exchange rate -- the opposite of the view held in the 
recent literature cited earlier. Each figure shows a regression line drawn 
through the scatter plot. The slope of this line is positive and highly 
significant in both cases.
4 Furthermore, this same pattern emerges in 
other exercises (not shown to save space) that consider countries 
grouped by geographic region. All regions considered show a positive 
correlation between saving and the real exchange rate, at both time 
frequencies analyzed.
5 
Looking at the 30-year averages, it is interesting to note that China 
(labeled CHN) is a substantial outlier, with a much higher saving rate than 
would be predicted from its real exchange rate on the basis of the 
international experience. The same is true for the high-growth Asian 
economies of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. However, among 
these high-saving economies, only China, Thailand and Malaysia appear 
to have sustained relatively depreciated real exchange rates over this 30-
year period. Korea and Singapore have operated with real exchange rates 
that have been relatively appreciated compared to the average in the 
sample. 
 
Simple correlations of the type just presented are useful as a 
corrective to the temptation to draw generalizations from a small set of 
highly visible episodes, but they can only provide limited evidence about 
the empirical relevance of the postulated link between the real exchange 
rate and the saving rate. The link hypothesized in the capital accumulation 
channel is between a real exchange rate that is depreciated by policy 
relative to what it would otherwise have been and a saving rate that is high 
 
4 Robust standard errors are used to mitigate the potential impact of outliers. 
5 However, the correlation is not always significant, due mainly to the varying 
sample sizes by region. 
   8
                                                
relative to what it would otherwise have been. Simple correlations do not 
satisfy the ceteris paribus conditions on which this link is predicated. 
Because these unconditional correlations do not hold constant other real 
exchange rate and saving determinants, the postulated relationship between 
the real exchange rate and the saving rate might be hidden in these 
correlations. One clear candidate for such a determinant is the level of per 
capita income, which has been found to exert a positive impact both on the 
level of the real exchange rate (through the Balassa-Samuelson effect) as 
well as on saving rates (e.g., Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén 2000). 
Looking at the bottom panel in the figure, it remains the 
case that the high-growth Asian economies of China, Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have unusually high saving 
rates. All of these countries have higher saving rates than would be 
predicted from their real exchange rates on the basis of the 
international experience, even after removing the effects of income 
levels on both variables. 
To summarize, there is only modest evidence that more 
depreciated real exchange rates are associated with higher saving 
rates, as postulated in the capital accumulation channel. Indeed, 
contrary to this view, the unconditional correlation between saving 
and the level of the real exchange rate is strongly positive, though 
this appears to at least partially reflect the positive association of 
both variables with the level of per capita income. Controlling for 
this factor changes the picture, revealing a negative correlation 
between saving rates and the real exchange rate. However, the 
correlation is very small and statistically significant only at the 
higher 10-year frequency. It is not statistically significant at the 30-
year horizon. This latter fact makes it problematic to interpret the 
negative correlation as reflecting the effects of a sustained real 
exchange rate depreciation on the saving rate, as would be expected 
from an entrenched development strategy. Overall, then, the 
international experience does not appear to provide much empirical 
support for a growth strategy predicated on the effects of a 
depreciated equilibrium real exchange rate on the saving rate, and 





6 To be clear, this is not to say that the level of the real exchange rate is of no consequence for 
long-term growth. What we are questioning here, in the light of the international evidence, is the 
role of the saving rate as the key channel of transmission from the real exchange rate to growth.  Figure 2 
Cross-Country Association between the Real Exchange Rate and 
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However, the crude nature of this empirical exercise leaves 
its results open to different interpretations. One such interpretation 
is that the hypothesized negative link between the real exchange 
rate and the saving rate emerges only when the real exchange rate 
is explicitly used as an instrument of development policy. In the 
absence of such a systematic policy, the real exchange rate and 
saving rate are both endogenous variables, and the correlation between 
them reflects the influence of a variety of exogenous variables whose 
behavior differs across countries and over time. This being the case, we 
should perhaps not expect to observe a systematic correlation in the 
international data. However, if the hypothesized link is valid, the subset 
of countries that have adopted the real exchange rate as a tool of 
development policy should exhibit both more depreciated real exchange 
rates and higher saving rates than would be predicted from their income 
levels. In other words, such countries should be found in the Northwest 
quadrant in the bottom panel of Figure 2. Since this is indeed the case 
for most of the high-growth Asian economies that have been said to 
adopt this policy, the evidence may not be inconsistent with the real 
exchange rate-saving link emphasized in the capital accumulation 
channel after all. This justifies probing deeper in the sections that 
follow. Specifically, we ask whether the proposed link is analytically 
consistent with standard open-economy macroeconomic models, and 
whether research on the determinants of saving rates --including in the 
high-growth Asian economies themselves -- has uncovered evidence of 
a causal link from exchange rate policy to the saving rate. 
3.  Saving and the Real Exchange Rate: Analytics 
As argued in the introduction, the analytical underpinnings of a channel 
of transmission from exchange rates to growth through the saving rate 
remain to be established. In this section we examine these analytical 
underpinnings by considering whether modern open-economy 
macroeconomic models would tend to predict the existence of such a 
link. Specifically, we analyze the effect of a depreciation of the 
equilibrium real exchange rate on the saving rate in the context of a 
representative-agent, intertemporal-optimizing model of the type that 
has become the standard framework of analysis in the "new" open-
economy macroeconomics. The distinguishing feature of the model we 
use is the fact that the real exchange rate is a policy target. The main 
conclusion from this type of model is that the saving rate will increase in 
response to a depreciation of the equilibrium real exchange rate only if   11
the real exchange rate depreciation generates a transitory increase in 
real income. As we will argue in this section, it is possible to construct 
such a mechanism, but it is by no means easy to do so, and the 
empirical relevance of the particular mechanism that we describe is 
questionable at best. 
3.1. The Model 
We use the simplest possible model to investigate this issue 
analytically. The framework is taken from Montiel (2007), where the 
technical details are described. To conduct this analysis, we need to 
consider an economy with two domestic production sectors --producing 
traded and nontraded goods -- so that we can define the real exchange 
rate (the relative price of traded goods in terms of nontraded goods), 
and distinguish it from the terms of trade (the price of importables in 
terms of exportables). Since our interest is only in household saving 
behavior, we will neglect investment by assuming that each sector pos-
sesses a fixed and sector-specific capital stock. We assume that a given 
stock of homogeneous labor can move freely between sectors, allowing 
sectoral output levels to change. The model contains a representative 
household that supplies a fixed amount of labor to the economy, and 
chooses a path of consumption over time that it allocates between 
traded and nontraded goods so as to maximize discounted utility over 
an infinite horizon, subject to an intertemporal budget constraint that 
depends on its initial financial wealth and expected flow of future 
income.  
Below we use the model to explore the effects of real exchange 
rate targets achieved through suitable nominal exchange rate policy. To 
properly consider the latter, the model has to describe a monetary 
economy, so our representative household will also have to decide how 
to allocate its financial wealth at each instant between money and other 
assets (which we consider to be internationally-traded interest-bearing 
"bonds"). We therefore also need to explain why such a household 
would hold money at all, as opposed to interest-paying assets. There are 
various ways to motivate the holding of money in models of this type, 
including inserting money directly in the household
’s utility function or 
imposing a cash-in advance transactions technology. We adopt a 
generalized and more flexible version of the latter, reflecting the view 
that money is valued because it reduces the transactions costs associated 
with consumption, but allowing households to alter the ratio of money   12
holdings to consumption expenditures in response to changes in the 
opportunity cost of holding money. As we will discuss further below, 
transactions costs may be incurred in the form of either of the two types 
of goods in the model. The model does not really require a government 
sector (other than a central bank to formulate exchange rate policy), so 
we assume that any revenues generated by seignorage are simply rebated 
to the household in lump-sum fashion. 
 
As a final preliminary matter, we need to describe the mechanism 
that allows the economy to reach a steady-state equilibrium. The 
difficulty here is that the representative household will seek to adopt a 
time-varying path of consumption as long as its rate of time preference 
differs from the market real interest rate, because only by doing so 
would it be able to equalize the marginal utility of consuming at 
different points in time. If the rate of time preference and market real 
interest rate happen to be equal to each other, the household chooses a 
flat consumption profile, a situation which does not lend itself to 
analyzing the question we are interested in  this section, because in this 
case satisfying the intertemporal budget constraint would imply that the 
household never saves. Thus, we need to adopt an analytical framework 
that allows for at least temporary differences between the household 
rate of time preference and the real interest rate. As pointed out by 
Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), there are essentially three ways to 
"close" small open-economy models while retaining this property. We 
choose the simplest of these, and one that has some empirical support. 
Specifically, we take the household
’s rate of time preference to be 
exogenous, but allow the market real interest rate faced by the 
representative domestic household to respond endogenously, by 
modeling the risk premium faced by the domestic economy as a 
decreasing function of the economy
’s net international investment 
position (its net financial claims on the rest of the world). A steady 
state is reached in this framework when, given the world risk-free 
interest rate, the domestic economy accumulates enough net claims on 
the rest of the world to make this risk premium small or large enough to 
close the gap between the domestic rate of time preference and the 
world risk-free interest rate. We are interested in the behavior of the 
saving rate during the transition path to this steady state. 
The issue that we seek to investigate can be described as follows. 
Suppose that the domestic central bank simply targets some nominal 
variable --say the nominal exchange rate -- and keeps it at a fixed   13
                                                
value, allowing the economy to reach a steady-state equilibrium in 
which the real exchange rate adjusts endogenously to whatever 
equilibrium value is implied by the economy
’s "real" fundamentals. We 
can label this the "baseline" scenario. Now consider what would 
happen if instead of targeting the nominal exchange rate the central 
bank adopts a specific real exchange rate target that differs from that 
which prevails under the baseline scenario, and specifically that is more 
depreciated than that prevailing in the baseline scenario. It can do so 
using the nominal exchange rate instrument at its disposal by devaluing 
the nominal exchange rate, and then continually depreciating it by an 
amount equal to the contemporaneous difference between the domestic 
inflation rate and the inflation rate of the country
’s trading partners. 
This policy can be described as "real exchange rate targeting." The 
questions are: what does the economy
’s new steady state look like 
under this policy, and -- more importantly for present purposes -- how 
does the saving rate behave during the transition from the original 
steady state to the new one?
7 
3.2. The Baseline 
A reasonable point of departure is to examine what the 
economy
’s equilibrium looks like in the baseline scenario -- i.e., in the 
absence of an explicit real exchange rate policy. In the steady state, 
household consumption must be constant and equal to household 
income, so the saving rate is zero -- the domestic economy is neither 
accumulating nor decumulating claims on the rest of the world. As 
mentioned above, the economy
’s steady-state net claims on the rest of the 
world must be such as to generate a risk premium in international 
financial markets that just bridges the gap between the domestic rate of 
time preference and the world real interest rate. Thus, the domestic 
economy
’s net claims on the rest of the world will be small (and its risk 
premium correspondingly high) when it has a relatively high rate of 
time preference or when the world interest rate is low. Both of those 




’s steady state must satisfy two conditions: an 
external balance condition, under which the country
’s trade balance (the 
 
7 In this model, steady-state saving is constant and, with no capital depreciation, equal to zero. Along the 
adjustment path, however, saving can show persistent departures from its steady-state level in response to 
disturbances. Such persistent swings in the saving rate are the focus of our analysis,    14
excess of its production of traded goods over its consumption of such 
goods) must be just equal to its (positive or negative) net income on the 
financial claims that it holds on the rest of the world, and an internal 
balance condition, which requires the market for nontraded goods to be 
in equilibrium (since such goods are only produced and consumed 
domestically, domestic output of nontraded goods must be equal to 
domestic demand for them in equilibrium). Two endogenous variables 
adjust to ensure that these conditions are met in the baseline scenario: the 
real exchange rate and the level of private consumption expenditure. A 
depreciation of the real exchange rate increases output of traded goods and 
decreases output of nontraded goods, as labor moves from the nontraded to 
the traded goods industry. At the same time, for a given level of private 
consumption expenditure, the depreciation switches household demand 
from traded to nontraded goods. Thus, a depreciation of the real exchange 
rate increases the excess supply of traded goods and reduces the excess 
supply of nontraded goods. On the other hand, an increase in private 
consumption expenditure increases excess demand for both types of goods. 
It follows that to maintain internal balance (equilibrium in the market for 
nontraded goods) in the steady state, an increase in private consumption 
expenditure must be associated with an appreciation of the equilibrium real 
exchange rate, but to sustain external balance, an increase in private 
consumption expenditure must be associated with a depreciation of the 
equilibrium real exchange rate. These relationships are illustrated in the 
form of the positively-sloped external balance locus EB and negatively-
sloped internal balance locus IB in Figure 3. The equilibrium values of the 
real exchange rate and the equilibrium level of household consumption are 
determined at the intersection of these two locii at the point A, which 
therefore determines the economy
’s steady-state equilibrium real exchange 
rate and steady-state level of private consumption expenditure. 
 
The equilibrium level of the domestic inflation rate plays a role in 
determining the equilibrium values of these two variables in the baseline 
scenario. Since the real exchange rate is constant in the steady state, the 
steady state inflation rate must be equal to the rate of depreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate, which is determined exogenously by the central 
bank, plus the world rate of inflation. If the nominal exchange rate is fixed, 
for example, the domestic inflation rate will be equal to the world inflation 
rate in steady-state equilibrium. This steady-state inflation rate is added to 
the steady-state real interest rate (recall that this is equal to the domestic 
rate of time preference) to determine the economy
’s steady-state nominal interest rate. In turn, this determines the real demand for money held by 
households per unit of consumption, and the transactions costs that 
households must incur to consume. The reason that this affects the 
economy
’s steady-state equilibrium values of the real exchange rate and 
private consumption is that these transactions costs affect the effective 
supplies of traded and nontraded goods in the economy. If these costs are 
borne in the form of nontraded goods, for example, then a higher steady-
state inflation rate will reduce the effective supply of such goods, shifting 
the internal balance locus downward, implying a more appreciated 
equilibrium real exchange rate and lower level of private consumption. If 
they are borne in the form of traded goods, then it is the supply of traded 
goods that will be reduced. In this case, the external balance locus is 
shifted upward, implying a more depreciated equilibrium real exchange 
rate and once again, a lower level of private consumption. 
 
Figure 3 
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3.3. Real Exchange Rate Targeting  
To examine the effect of policies directed at the real 
exchange rate on the saving rate, consider next what happens to the 
economy if the central bank decides to adopt a real exchange rate 
target, and proceeds to target a more depreciated real exchange 
rate than that corresponding to the baseline steady state just 
described. 
This policy implies that, since the real exchange rate is set 
exogenously by the central bank, it can no longer play the 
equilibrating function in domestic markets described above. If the 
real exchange rate cannot adjust to allow the economy to 
simultaneously achieve internal and external balance, then 
something else must do so. Notice that under real exchange rate 
targeting, the central bank is no longer fixing the value of the 
nominal exchange rate. Thus, the steady-state inflation rate is no 
longer pinned down by central bank policy. Formally, the steady-
state inflation rate becomes the endogenous variable that adjusts to 
allow the economy to simultaneously achieve internal and external 
balance. 
To see how this works, suppose that transactions costs are 
incurred in the form of nontraded goods only, and consider how 
the inflation rate and level of private consumption expenditure 
jointly interact to ensure internal and external balance under real 
exchange rate targeting. The analysis is provided in Figure 4. 
Since the real exchange rate is now an exogenous policy variable 
and the inflation rate is the adjusting endogenous variable, the 
steady-state inflation rate replaces the real exchange rate on the 
vertical axis. Since all transactions costs are borne in the form of 
nontraded goods, the inflation rate has no effect on the external 
balance locus, which is therefore vertical at the level of private 
consumption expenditure required to maintain external balance (c*). 
However, the internal balance locus has a negative slope: an 
increase in private consumption expenditure creates an excess 
demand for nontraded goods, which requires a reduction in the 
domestic inflation rate to reduce transactions costs and thus free up 
the resources required to meet the additional demand for non-traded 
goods. The economy
’s steady state inflation rate and level of 
private consumption expenditure are determined at the intersection of these two locii. 
 
Figure 4 












Suppose that initially the central bank sets the real 
exchange rate target at a level equal to the equilibrium real 
exchange rate from Figure 3. In that case, the domestic inflation 
rate must be equal to the world inflation rate as before, since the 
new regime just mimics the baseline scenario. But now suppose 
that the central bank adopts a more depreciated real exchange rate 
target. Notice that this change in the real exchange rate target has 
no effect on the domestic rate of time preference or on the world 
risk-free real interest rate, so the economy
ís steady-state level of net 
financial claims on the rest of the world is unaffected. However, the 
policy disturbs both the external and internal balance locii, and so 
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will alter the steady-state values of domestic inflation and private 
consumption expenditure. In this case, the external balance locus 
will shift to the right, as in Figure 5, since with a more depreciated 
real exchange rate, which increases production of traded goods and 
switches private consumption away from traded goods, a higher 
level of total private consumption expenditure is compatible with 
external balance. At the same time, the internal balance locus shifts to the 
left, since the reduced supply of nontraded goods induced by the real 
depreciation calls for a reduced level of total private consumption 
expenditure to maintain equilibrium in the market for nontraded goods. 
The upshot is that the steady-state inflation rate falls and the steady-state 
level of private expenditure increases. The reason that households are able 
to sustain a permanently higher level of private consumption expenditure 
in this case is that the reduction in the domestic inflation rate effectively 
increases the supply of nontraded goods available to the economy (by 
reducing transactions costs) and thus acts like a favorable permanent 
productivity shock. In other words, households are able to sustain higher 
consumption levels because they have a higher income level. 
The important point, however, is that this happens as soon as the 
more depreciated real exchange rate target is adopted. The inflation rate 
falls immediately, the effective supply of nontraded goods rises 
immediately, and the level of private consumption also rises immediately. 
Thus, household consumption expenditure immediately rises to meet the 
new higher level of permanent income. Consequently, this policy does not 
create a gap between household income and household consumption 
expenditure -- in other words, there is no effect on the national saving rate. 
This is an important result, because it highlights the difficulty of producing 
a real exchange rate effect on the saving rate in a standard intertemporal 
optimizing model. To achieve such an effect what is required is that the 
real depreciation create an incentive for households to temporarily depress 
their consumption relative to their income levels. Since an unanticipated, 
permanent depreciation in the central bank
’s real exchange rate target does 
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Is there any way to create such an effect in the context of this 
model? The answer is yes. Consider what happens if the pursuit of the 
more depreciated real exchange rate target is (and is correctly expected to 
be) transitory, rather than permanent. The result is now quite different. 
Again, the steady-state value of the economy
’s net international 
investment position is unchanged. But now, while the more depreciated 
real exchange rate target is in place, output of the traded goods sector 
expands and that of the nontraded goods sector contracts. Given the more 
depreciated real exchange rate, private consumption demand also changes 
its composition, with households demanding more non-traded goods and 
fewer traded goods at any given level of private consumption expenditure. 
Thus, this situation creates an incipient excess demand for non-traded   20
goods. To clear the nontraded goods market, the inflation rate must fall to 
reduce transactions costs and thereby increase the supply of nontraded 
goods. This reduction in the inflation rate acts like a positive productivity 
shock, because the reduction in transactions costs that it induces 
effectively increases the total supply of goods available for consumption in 
the economy. But this effective increase in the economy
’s productivity 
arising from a reduction in the inflation rate is only temporary: it only lasts 
as long as the more depreciated real exchange rate target is kept in place. 
Because this increase in real income is only temporary, consumption-
smoothing motives prevent the representative household from 
consuming all its income gains while they are in place. The 
household therefore increases its consumption level, but by less 
than the increase in its real income -- in other words, it is induced 
to save in order to be able to sustain a higher level of consumption 
after the real exchange rate target is abandoned and the inflation rate 
and associated transactions costs return to their initial levels. 
It may be worth noting that, while the mechanism just 
described indeed generates a positive effect of a more depreciated 
real exchange rate target on the household saving rate, it falls well 
short of establishing the analytical link between a permanently more 
depreciated real exchange rate and a higher house-hold saving rate 
that would be required to explain low-frequency correlations 
between the real exchange rate and the saving rate in cross-country 
data. The reasons are two. First, the emergence of this association 
explicitly requires a transitory depreciation in the central bank
’s 
real exchange rate target, rather than a permanent one. However, 
this may be acceptable, since the duration of the real exchange rate 
depreciation would coincide with that of the positive effect on the 
saving rate. But second --and more importantly --it can be shown 
that the longer the more depreciated real exchange rate target is 
expected to be sustained, the weaker will be the observed positive 
effect on the household saving rate, even while the more depreciated 
real exchange rate is in place. The reason is that the longer the 
positive productivity effect is expected to last, the higher the value 
of consumption the household can maintain without violating its 
intertemporal budget constraint. Thus, even if this mechanism is 
operative, sustained equilibrium real exchange rate depreciations of 
the type we have been considering would at best tend to have weak 
effects on the household saving rate. 
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3.4.  Implications 
The model we have just analyzed contains a very specific 
mechanism linking the level of the real exchange rate to the saving 
rate --i.e., through the equilibrium rate of inflation and its effects 
on the transactions costs associated with consumption. But this 
particular mechanism serves as an illustration of a more general 
point. Essentially what is required for the pursuit of a more depre-
ciated real exchange rate target to generate an increase in the 
saving rate in the popular open-economy framework just described 
is that the real exchange rate depreciation generates a front-loaded 
increase in real income -- i.e., an in-crease that is greater in the 
short run than in the long run. The increase in real income needs to 
be front-loaded so that consumption smoothing will cause 
households to save some of their additional real income rather than 
simply consume it all, as they do in the model when the more 
depreciated real exchange rate is adopted as a permanent target. 
 
One way to achieve this analytically is as we have done it in 
this section -- i.e., by building into the model a mechanism through 
which the timing of the real income rise coincides with the period of 
real exchange rate depreciation, and by making the real exchange 
rate depreciation itself temporary. Though the inflation-cum-
transactions cost mechanism incorporated in the model of this section 
produces this result, the empirical relevance of such a mechanism is 
questionable, and it is hard to think of other mechanisms that would have a 
similar effect. An alternative way to achieve the same result would be for a 
permanent real depreciation to result in a short-run productivity 
improvement greater than its long-run counterpart. However, it is hard to 
think of mechanisms that would have such an effect. Certainly the types of 
effects on TFP expected under the TFP channel discussed above, in which 
the rate of growth of domestic TFP depends on the share of traded goods 
production in GDP, would be unlikely to behave in this way. The reason is 
that the gradual accretion of economy-wide productivity improvements 
caused by an increase in the level of production of traded goods would 
accumulate over time, resulting in larger long-run than short-run increases 
in productivity. This would be particularly so in the (realistic) scenario in 
which the relocation of productive inputs is subject to adjustment costs. If 
productivity levels are expected to increase over time, however, forward-
looking optimizing households would tend to increase consumption in 
anticipation of higher future incomes, thus reducing, rather than raising,   22
the saving rate on impact. 
The upshot is that, while it is possible to generate positive effects 
on the saving rate of a depreciation in the equilibrium real exchange rate in 
a main-stream open-economy model, it is by no means easy to do so, and 
it is unclear whether the types of effects that can be generated in this 
framework could be empirically important. 
4. Interpreting High Savings Rates around the World 
While theory is thus not inconsistent with the proposition that a 
more depreciated real exchange rate could have a positive effect on 
household saving, the conditions for this effect to emerge in standard open-
economy models appear to be stringent. Nevertheless, as long as such a 
link is admissible theoretically, it is at least possible that it has been 
important empirically. This section examines whether such a link, 
featuring causation from the real exchange rate to the saving rate, has 
indeed been identified as empirically important in determining cross-
country differences in saving rates. 
The factors behind these differences have been the focus of a large 
literature, which we can only touch upon. The issue we explore here is 
what role exchange rate policy, and in particular a depreciated real 
exchange rate, has played in existing explanations of cross-country 
differences in saving rates. We consider first the broad international 
evidence, and then focus more specifically on explanations for high saving 
in East Asia, the region of the world where the real exchange rate-saving 
link has received the most attention. 
 
4.1.  Determinants of International Differences in Saving Rates 
 
As the empirical literature has noted, there are significant 
regional differences in saving rates, with East Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa at the extremes. Countries in the former region have tended to 
save in excess of 30 percent of GDP on average, while those in the 
latter have typically featured saving rates in the range of 10-15 
percent of GDP. Industrial countries are in an intermediate position, 
generally saving in the vicinity of 20 percent of GDP. As we will 
discuss below, explanations of cross-country differences in saving 
rates have drawn on a variety of different saving determinants 
suggested by theory, but two have played particularly prominent   23
                                                
roles:
8 the level and growth rate of income per capita, both of which 
tend to be positively related to saving rates. The role of the level of 
income per capita may arise because of the pressures of subsistence 
needs at low levels of income, such as would emerge under a Stone-
Geary specification of utility. This interpretation is supported by the 
fact that the positive effect of income levels on private saving rates 
tends to taper off at higher levels of income (see Masson, Bayoumi, 
and Samiei 1998, as well as Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven 
2000a,b). In turn, the effect of growth on the saving rate may be due 
to a growth-associated shifting of income from low-saving older 
cohorts to high-saving young cohorts within countries, or to the 
influence of habit formation on consumption, which causes changes 
in consumption to lag those in income (Deaton 1999 offers a 
comprehensive discussion). In any case, almost all studies of 
international differences in saving rates include these variables, and 
they are often found to have statistically significant explanatory 
power. 
 
Aside from the basic roles of income per capita and growth 
rates, the large cross-country differences in saving rates has caused 
researchers to examine the roles of a large number of other explanatory 
factors suggested by theory. These include structural features of 
economies such as demographic composition, the presence of 
mandatory saving schemes, uncertainty in the macroeconomic envi-
ronment, financial depth and the importance of borrowing constraints; 
short-run policy variables such as fiscal policy (because of potential 
Ricardian equivalence effects), interest rates, and tax incentives; and 
exogenous shocks such as inflows of foreign aid and fluctuations in the 
terms of trade. Results can be summarized briefly: increases in the 
young-age and old-age dependency ratios both tend to lower private 
saving rates, in line with life-cycle theories of consumption. Research 
on countries with particularly high saving rates, such as Singapore, or 
that have secured a dramatic increase in saving over a short period of 
time, such as Chile, has emphasized the role of mandatory saving 
schemes such as Singapore
’s Central Provident Fund (e.g., World Bank 
1994), finding that such schemes have had a significant effect on the 
domestic saving rate. Uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment, 
arising either from the structure of production (e.g., agricultural income 
tends to be more uncertain than non-agricultural income) or from poor 
 




                                                
domestic macroeconomic management, has been found to increase 
saving for precautionary reasons (although uncertainty in the domestic 
macroeconomic environment may cause such saving to be invested 
abroad). Financial structure seems to matter, but in ambiguous ways: in 
particular, borrowing constraints have been found to exert a strong positive 
impact on household saving (Jappelli and Pagano 1994), but the effects of 
financial development (which is often associated with a relaxation in 
borrowing constraints) are less clear cut (Bandiera et al 2000). On the 
other hand, the evidence suggests that interest rates and tax incentives have 
only weak effects at best on household saving (Edwards 1995), and that 
Ricardian equivalence typically does not hold, so that private saving 
offsets to public saving are small at best. The effects of aid on national 
saving are typically not clear-cut (Obstfeld 1999); in turn, terms of trade 
windfalls raise saving (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven 2000a, 
Agenor and Aizenman 2004). 
As is clear from this overview, a substantial amount of ingenuity 
has been expended on attempting to explain international differences in 
saving rates, and the theory has been mined extensively to identify 
potential explanatory variables. However, despite the large and diverse set 
of explanatory factors that has been considered in these studies, the 
empirical literature concerned with international differences in saving rates 
has not even considered, much less provided evidence for, a possible role 
for the level of the real exchange rate in influencing national saving 
rates.
9. On the whole, exchange rate policy has not been considered a 
potentially important determinant of national saving rates in the empirica
 
ving in East Asia 
As indicated above, countries in the East Asian region have 
recently stood out for their relatively high saving rates. Although there is a 
large body of literature that has identified high saving rates and relatively 
depreciated real exchange rates as two of the characteristics of the high-
growth economies in East Asia (World Bank 1993), these two variables 
have not typically been linked to each other causally. This is so despite the 
fact that the interpretation of high saving rates in East Asia, like so much 
else associated with the growth experience of these countries, has been 
 
9 A few papers have looked for direct effects of real exchange rate misalignment on saving, without 
much success. One exception is Ghura and Greenes (1993), who conclude that overvaluation 
discouraged saving in Sub-Saharan Africa.   25
xplanations for high saving in East Asia have focused on 
ther factors. 
 
ving rates in 
the reg
                                                
controversial. As with the broader literature on international differences in 
saving rates, e
o
One clue to explaining high saving rates in East Asia is that saving 
rates in the region have not always been high. Private saving rates in East 
Asia trended up continuously during the region
’s high growth period from 
the mid-70s to the mid-1990s that preceded the Asian crisis, starting at 
about 15 percent and rising to about 30 percent of GDP. Though China
’s 
(national) saving rate has been high for some time, averaging 29 percent of 
GDP during 1970-77, before the country
’s change in economic policy 
launched it on its high-growth path, it also increased over time, reaching 
41 percent of GDP in 1993-94, just before the exchange rate system was 
unified. There is little variation within the region in the pattern of saving 
rates over time. Overall, saving rates increased sharply in all countries 
except the Philippines during the two decades from the mid-1970s to the 
mid-1990s. Since public saving increased as well over the same period, the 
increase in national saving was even more dramatic than that in private 
saving alone.
10 Whereas national saving rates in Southeast Asian and 
Latin America were similar during the mid-70s, by 1995 the regional gap 
was about 20 percent. The implication of this change in saving rates over 
time is that high saving rates in the region do not simply reflect factors that 
could be captured by a regional fixed effect. Thus, although cultural 
factors are often cited to explain Asian saving rates, the increase in saving 
rates in the region over time does not support the view that high saving 
was driven by a cultural predisposition, but rather was induced by 
phenomena that varied over time. The interpretation of high sa
ion has indeed been linked to a variety of such factors. 
An orthodox approach to explaining high saving rates in the region 
is typified by the World Bank
’s 1993 "miracle
” study. This study cites an 
early demographic transition, macro stability, and policies toward the 
financial sector as the key policy contributions to the encouragement of 
higher private saving. An early demographic transition tended to increase 
the relative size of the high-saving working age cohort and decrease 
dependency ratios (see also Bloom and Williamson 1997). Macro stability, 
in turn, was judged to contribute to higher saving rates both directly and 
indirectly. The direct effect operates through higher public saving rates 
(see also Edwards 1995), while the key indirect contribution is through the 
 
10 The surge in saving in Thailand in the 1980s, for example, was largely driven by the public 
sector.    26
ncial system and 
other alternatives, than for the aggregate saving flow. 
in some countries (Japan, Singapore and Malaysia) may also have made 
achievement of low and stable inflation. Because high inflation tends to be 
volatile inflation, it has the effect of making real interest rates both 
negative as well as unpredictable, tending to increase the risk associated 
with financial saving and thus discouraging such saving. Policies toward 
the financial sector included the achievement of financial sector stability, 
resisting severe financial repression, and making formal saving vehicles 
more convenient to small savers. The governments of high-performing 
Asian countries were credited with achieving the security of banks by 
protecting them from competition (mainly through restrictions on entry, 
except in Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Singapore), and safer banks 
encourage saving by reducing the risk associated with financial saving. In 
contrast with other literature of the time, the elimination of financial 
repression is not cited in the Bank study as a reason for higher saving rates, 
because repression was retained for most of the high growth period in the 
high-performing Asian economies. However, these countries practiced a 
relatively mild form of financial repression, which was consistent with 
positive real interest rates and financial deepening. In addition, a reduction 
in the degree of financial repression practiced in the region is cited as 
possibly having contributed to an increase in saving rates over time. 
Finally, policies to promote the accessibility of the formal financial sector 
during the high-growth period included bank branching to rural areas and 
the adoption of postal saving schemes. Postal saving systems in Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan, for example, were designed to 
attract small savers (by offering greater security and lower transaction 
costs than the informal financial sector). However, much of this 
reasoning seems more relevant for savers
’ decisions regarding the 
allocation of their assets between the domestic fina
Other explanations focus on less orthodox factors. Some 
authors, for ex-ample, have emphasized the roles of restrictions on 
consumer credit and forced saving schemes in explaining high Asian 
saving rates. Restrictions on consumer credit in the context of financial 
repression, coupled with taxes on luxury goods, are perceived to have 
been important in encouraging household saving. The financial systems 
in countries such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan channeled resources into 
infrastructure and productive business uses, and away from housing and 
consumer credit which, according to some authors (see Patrick 1994), 
may have resulted in higher saving rates and more rapid growth, but at 
some welfare cost. In turn, the implementation of such provident funds   27
                                                
a large contribution to saving rates.
11 In addition, other observers 
(Birdsall and Sabot 1998) have argued that the adoption of a "shared 
growth”
  strategy, in which growth occurred in the context of a 
relatively egalitarian income distribution, may have encouraged saving 
by moving the poor away from subsistence and thus allowing them to 
save. 
All of these mechanisms, orthodox or otherwise, are consistent 
with high saving making a key contribution to growth by facilitating 
capital accumulation. A final set of interpretations, however, sees 
saving not as a cause of capital accumulation, but rather as its result. 
Several authors have argued, for example, that the saving transitions in 
East Asia reflect the effects of investment incentives on investment 
rates, and that higher investment rates resulted in higher saving rates, 
either directly or through higher growth rates. Singh (1995), for 
example, argues that high saving rates in the successful Asian 
economies did not reflect particularly high levels of household saving, 
but rather of corporate saving. These were the results of large corporate 
profits plus inducements and incentives to retain earnings. Large 
corporate profits were achieved by restrictions on domestic competition 
(in Japan and Korea) and import protection (there and elsewhere). 
Government provided fiscal and other incentives to retain these -- i.e., 
not to distribute them as dividends -- for example by taxing dividends 
and not retained earnings or capital gains.
12 Rodrik (2000) similarly 
emphasizes the driving role of investment incentives, seeing these as 
resulting in larger investment and growth rates in Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan, with higher saving rates resulting from the increase in growth 
rates. 
Careful empirical studies do not greatly restrict the range of 
possible determinants of Asian saving. The panel-data econometric 
evidence in Dayal-Gulati and Thimann (1997), for example, attributes 
high saving rates among the high-growth Asian economies to macro 
stability, public saving, mandatory saving schemes, and financial 
deepening (presumably reflecting positive real interest rates and secure 
banks). By contrast, in studying China
’s household saving behavior, 
 
11  Whether such funds encourage total saving depends on the extent to which they force low 
savers to save more that they would have otherwise chosen to do. Faruqee and Husain (1998) 
conclude that provident funds did help raise aggregate saving in Singapore and Malaysia.  
12 As
 in the discussion of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007b), this argument would need to 
establish that households did not pierce the corporate veil and reduce their own saving as 
corporate saving increased. Otherwise, private saving would be unaffected by whether saving is 
done by corporations or by households. Singh does not address this issue, leaving the matter of 
high private saving still to be explained.    28
Kraay (2000) emphasizes the role of an entirely different set of variables. 
He finds that household saving was affected by above-subsistence 
income levels and expectations of future growth, but demographic 
factors and income uncertainty do not help explain household saving in 
China. Other authors have suggested instead that China
’s high saving 
rate is largely a result of the low coverage of its pension and health 
systems, together with restrictions on family size. 
In short, there is no consensus at present on the extent to which 
increases in saving rates in East Asia, and their mobilization through 
the financial system, were due to growth, demographics, reduced 
inflation, higher real interest rates, the spread of financial institution 
offices, or other variables. What seems to be true, however, is that 
students of this issue have not considered exchange rate policy among 
the myriad of possible explanations for high saving rates in Asia. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The bottom line is that the real exchange rate-to-saving link -- 
or what we have labeled the capital accumulation channel -- is 
conceptually and empirically weak. While there are clearly examples of 
countries in which high saving rates, depreciated real exchange rates, and 
high growth have been observed at the same time, as well as some in 
which the reverse of each of these outcomes has also materialized 
simultaneously, there is no clear-cut association between more 
depreciated real exchange rates and higher saving rates in the 
international experience, even after controlling for levels of GDP per 
capita. Moreover, even in those countries where high saving rates and 
relatively depreciated real exchange rates have been observed 
simultaneously, Bernanke
’s (2005) view that causation runs from high 
saving rates to a more depreciated real exchange rate is a plausible 
explanation. 
 
Perhaps a more serious difficulty is that there is as yet no 
obviously plausible analytical basis for the capital accumulation 
channel itself. While a well-known model by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau 
and Garber (2004) generates a link from a depreciated real exchange 
rate to a higher saving rate, that model predicts that the higher saving 
rate will result in larger current account surpluses rather than more 
domestic capital accumulation. Moreover, while it is possible to specify   29
                                                
standard modern open-economy models that generate the desired 
causation from a more depreciated real exchange rate to a higher 
household saving rate, the requirement for this outcome to emerge in 
the context of such models -- i.e., that the exchange rate policy results 
in a front-loaded productivity boost -- appears to be quite stringent. We 
have described one mechanism that would indeed generate this result, 
operating through inflation-induced transactions costs, but the empirical 
relevance of this mechanism remains to be established, and in any case the 
result emerges only when the exchange rate policy is transitory. 
 
Finally, the literature on cross-country differences in saving rates 
has not identified exchange rate policy in general, or a depreciated real 
exchange rate in particular, as an important factor in explaining such 
differences. Even in the high-saving, high-growth countries that have 
provided the main impetus for professional interest in the capital-
accumulation channel, explanations for high saving rates have tended to 
focus on factors such as demographics, financial-sector policies, mandated 
saving schemes, and fiscal policies, rather than exchange rate policies. 
 
Though we have not focused on it in this paper, the second link in 
the capital accumulation channel, from higher saving rates to higher 
growth rates through higher investment rates, appears to be at least as 
problematic as the first. There are two major difficulties with this link. The 
first one is empirical: as indicated above, theory is consistent with reverse 
causation from growth to saving, so a positive empirical correlation 
between saving and growth rates is subject to more than one interpretation 
(Deaton 1999). The possibility of bidirectional causality between saving 
and growth has led several authors to perform various tests of Granger 
causality with international data, often with the result that growth typically 
precedes saving, rather than vice versa.
13 Although Granger tests can 
hardly be viewed as conclusive, the upshot is that time series studies 
provide little evidence that the positive cross-country correlation between 
 
13 The classic reference is Carroll and Weil (1994). Baharumshah, Thanoon and Rashid (2003) 
reach similar conclusions using data for East Asian countries. Attanasio, Picci and Scorcu (2000) 
find that the patterns of Granger causality between saving and growth in a large cross-country 
sample are not robust to minor changes in specification and econometric technique. Rodrik 
(2000) found in an international sample of saving transitions that increases in saving rates 
tended to be followed by only temporary increases in growth rates, while increases in growth 
rates tended to be associated with permanent increases in saving rates, consistent with the East 
Asian experience summarized in the last section. He interpreted this as suggesting that saving is 
insignificant as a causal factor for long-run growth, and tends to be an outcome -- rather than a 
determinant -- of high growth rates. More recently, Mohan (2006) derived a similar result for a 
large sample of countries at various income levels.   30
saving and growth rates reflects causation from the former to the latter. The 
second problem is analytical: the link between saving and domestic 
investment may be quite loose in financially open economies, in which 
higher saving rates may simply be associated with a larger surplus on the 
current account of the balance of payments. Though Feldstein and Horioka 
(1983) documented a strong correlation between saving and domestic 
investment even in economies that appear to be highly open financially, this 
correlation has weakened over time as capital mobility has increased, and 
there is a now a host of potential explanations for the saving-investment 
correlation that do not rely on causation running from saving rates to 
investment rates (see Coakley, Fulasi, and Smith 1998). 
 
In short, there is as yet little analytical or empirical support for the 
view that an exchange rate policy geared to the maintenance of a 
depreciated real exchange rate promotes increased domestic saving, and 
through more saving, larger rates of domestic capital accumulation and 
growth. If exchange rate policy indeed has a significant impact on 
economic growth in developing countries, it is likely to do so through 
what this paper has labeled the TFP channel, rather than through the 
capital accumulation channel.   31
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